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RESUMEN 
En este trabajo se presenta la reciente evolución del empleo temporal y permanente en 
las regiones españolas durante el periodo 1995-2001. Primero, se muestran las 
importantes diferencias existentes en la composición del empleo por tipo de contrato a 
nivel regional y la persistencia de tales diferencias a lo largo del periodo analizado. 
Para estudiar los determinantes de la baja tasa de empleo permanente en España se 
ha realizado un ejercicio econométrico con datos individuales de panel usando la 
Encuesta de Población Activa. Nuestro principal resultado es que las diferencias en 
Costes Laborales Unitarios y por tanto en la remuneración del trabajo frente a la 
productividad aparente del mismo, es la principal variable agregada capaz de explicar 
las diferencias de la tasa de empleo permanente entre las distintas comunidades 
autónomas. 
 




We study the use of permanent and temporary contracts across Spanish regions during 
the period 1995-2001. First we show that there are significant differences among the 
regional rates of permanent employment and that these differences tend to persist over 
time. To understand the underlying factors behind these observed differences we 
estimate a binary choice model for the individual probability of having a permanent 
contract, taking advantage of the panel data dimension of the Spanish Labour Force 
Survey. Our main results are that unit labour cost differentials, and thus labour 
productivity and total labour cost differentials, partially explain the divergence of regional 
permanent employment rates. Moreover, compared to the influence of regional fixed 
effects and other possible explanations such as sector specialisation or the presence of 
small firms in the region, unit labour costs explain more than two thirds of the observed 
variance in the permanent employment rate across Spanish regions, once all the 
relevant heterogeneity is taken into account . 
 
Keywords: Temporary Employment, Unit Labour Costs, Random Effects, Spanish 
Regions. 






























The recent evolution of the Spanish labour market seems to indicate that since the introduction of 
fixed-term or temporary contracts in the labour market, it has been difficult to substitute them for 
permanent contracts. During the 1990s the Spanish government implemented various labour 
market reforms aimed at reducing the presence of fixed-term contracts among employees, yet the 
permanent employment rate has only experienced a slight increase of around three percentage 
points during the period 1995-2001. Moreover, this small change has taken place in a favourable 
environment characterised by a period of economic growth and decline in the bargaining power 
of labour unions. In this paper we analyse the causes behind this low permanent employment rate 
and the low elasticity of permanent job creation to the institutional reforms made during the 
1990s in Spain. The surge of fixed-term contracts is related to the firm’s desire to reduce total 
labour costs in relation to output and therefore it may be argued that the markedly high rate of 
temporality in Spain should be related, besides other covariates, to the behaviour of total labour 
costs and labour productivity. During the period analysed, unit labour costs permanently 
increased at an annual average rate of 1.3%. This means that labour productivity grew at a lower 
rate than total labour compensation per employee, reducing the chances of increasing permanent 
employment during the upturn of the 1995-2001 period. In fact, one of the main results obtained 
in this paper is that, on average, when unit labour costs increase by 1% the probability of 
obtaining a permanent contract declines by more than 1%.  
During the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s Spain had one of the tightest labour 
markets in Europe and its unemployment rate was one of the highest –over 20% . This led 
Spanish policy makers to implement flexibility measures such as the well-known 1984 labour 
reform. The flexibilization strategy implemented at that time is a perfect example of what are 
known as two-tier selective labour market policies. Broadly speaking, the reform of 1984 
consisted of introducing the possibility of hiring workers on flexible, fixed-duration contracts. 
The objective was to foster job creation in order to reduce the already high unemployment rate. 
As a result of this reform, temporary contracts increased from 18% in 1987 to 33% in 1994 and 
this rapid increase positioned Spain as the European country with the highest rate of temporality. 
In 1994 and 1997 new changes were introduced in the regulation of the labour market aimed at 
reducing the scope for using fixed-term contracts by, among other measures, reducing the firing 
costs for permanent employees. However these institutional reforms have hardly affected the use 
of temporary contracts and in 2001 they still represented 32.5% of total contracts in Spain while 
in the European Union this rate was almost three times lower, around 13%.  
From a theoretical point of view, certain supply and demand factors may be behind the rise of 
fixed-term employment. From a worker’s perspective, there are essentially two opposing ways of 
considering these types of contracts. They can be viewed as a springboard towards more stable 
positions (Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 2002; Varejao and Portugal, 2002) and, especially for 





























Secondly, they can be viewed as a permanent condition, voluntary or otherwise, not necessarily 
ending in a permanent job. This second case represents a valid alternative only if it compensates 
the uncertainty intrinsic to temporary contracts by offering a higher wage. Given the experience 
in Spain we consider, however, that the use of temporary contracts is motivated by employer 
choices rather than worker preferences for temporary jobs, since permanent contracts are at least 
as desirable as temporary ones from the worker’s point of view, in terms of both job stability and 
wage gains. There is to our knowledge no evidence suggesting that temporary workers are 
offered a wage premium that compensates for the higher separation risks. On the contrary, the 
Spanish experience at hand indicates that there is a wage penalty associated with temporary 
employment (Jimeno and Toharia 1993; De La Rica, 2004; García Pérez and Rebollo, 2005). It is 
also unlikely that the rise in temporary employment is driven by worker preferences regarding 
flexibility. For instance, Guell (2003) shows that during the period 1987-1994 the use of 
temporary contracts was involuntary for around 89% of workers. This is also confirmed by the 
information provided by the Spanish Labour Force Survey, which shows that during 1987-2002 
as much as 85% of temporary workers reported that they had a temporary job because they could 
not find a permanent one. This survey also indicates that the proportion of temporary jobs for 
seasonal reasons is fairly low and has remained unaffected during the different labour reforms 
carried out during the 1990s. 
On the contrary, demand factors together with certain institutional reforms better explain the 
recent change in the composition of employment. From a microeconomic perspective there are 
alternative reasons why a firm may offer a temporary job. Firstly, a fixed-term contract can be 
used as a transitory situation in which employers may observe worker’s productivity. For 
instance, matching models point out that this type of contract may be a mechanism through which 
firms screen different workers to ascertain the best match, because the true value of the match is 
revealed only after the match is formed. When the information regarding the true value of the 
match emerges, it will be classified as good or bad and accordingly, the match is either 
maintained or terminated. Secondly, these contracts are a more flexible instrument to adapt 
employment to the negative shocks faced by the firm. In fact, the success of fixed-term contracts 
is based on the fact that they imply lower labour costs for the firm, mainly through a reduction in 
firing costs. Besides, temporary workers are characterised by a lower level of unionisation. 
Thirdly, as efficiency wage models point out (Guell, 2003), the use of fixed-term contracts to fill 
permanent positions may be part of the firm’s personnel policy. In this framework, firms may 
choose different combinations of wages and turnover in a context where costly monitoring and 
training are likely to be associated with a high wage. Firms prefer one type of strategy to the 
other depending on several factors such as their technology, skills and cost structure.  
Given the rapid upsurge of temporary contracts on the Spanish labour market and the different 
reforms carried out during the 1990s, Spain provides an interesting case study. The reforms of the 
1990s sought to reduce the gap between the firing costs of temporary and permanent contracts 





























contract (see Dolado, García-Serrano and Jimeno, 2002). An intriguing aspect of the Spanish 
experience is that the reforms carried out during that period had less effect than expected.  
One way to obtain a deeper understanding of the persistent low permanent employment rate in 
Spain is to consider regional dispersion. The important differences in this ratio across Spanish 
regions might explain the observed behaviour of the national permanent employment rate. 
Regions such as Andalusia and the Canary Islands had rates of around 59-61% in 2001, while in 
regions such as Asturias and Madrid it was 20 percentage points higher and closer to European 
standards. These observed differences may be related to divergences in the steady state 
employment composition across regions. Broadly speaking, the steady-state composition of 
employment by type of contract may differ between regions due to differences in the labour force 
composition, in relative productive specialisation, in productivity levels and in labour costs 
within sectors. Nevertheless, in this paper we hypothesize that one important determinant of these 
differences is labour productivity and subsequently unit labour cost differentials. Therefore, we 
proceed to analyse how much of the differences in permanent employment may be attributed to 
“steady state differentials” and in particular the role played by unit labour cost differentials.  
We study the determinants of the apparent lack of sensitivity of permanent contracts to the 
institutional reforms made during the 1990s using the regional and sector variability of the 
Spanish economy. We estimate a binary choice model for the individual probability of working 
under a permanent contract. To account for the unobserved heterogeneity we estimate a random 
effect logit model. From this model we estimate the elasticity of the individual probability of 
having a permanent contract relative to unit labour costs and compute the role of this covariate in 
the regional variance of the permanent employment rate. From our results we obtain an estimated 
elasticity of –1.27. That is, a 1% increase in unit labour costs, other things equal, reduces the 
probability of having a permanent contract by 1.27%. Furthermore, we find that unit labour costs 
account for more than two thirds of the observed variance of this probability, once all the relevant 
heterogeneity is controlled . 
The present study is organised as follows. First, we briefly review previous research, emphasising 
those papers that focus on the Spanish case. In the third section we describe the data used and 
offer some previous statistics of our sample. Sections 5 and 6 describe the econometric 
approaches used and the main results and Section 7 presents our main conclusions. 
2 Background 
Since the 1980s, when temporary contracts emerged in Spain as an instrument to increase labour 
market flexibility, there has been a significant and ever-growing literature on fixed-term contracts 
and their implications for the labour market. Given that the effects of temporary contracts on 
labour market performance have not always been as expected, this issue is nowadays an object of 
debate not only for Spanish economists but also for their European and American counterparts, 





























From the efficiency perspective it is important to understand the role played by the temporary 
contract. In the case of temporary contracts used as a screening device to obtain the best match, 
productivity will tend to rise. Similarly, they can have a positive effect on work effort if the 
worker perceives that the rehiring probability depends on actual productivity. On the contrary, 
when temporary contracts are merely used to substitute permanent employees, productivity will 
tend to fall (Güell, 2000). For instance, this is the case when jobs require specific human capital 
investment and the investment decision depends on the expected duration of the job or in other 
types of activities where the provision of incentives is important to increase worker productivity. 
Albert, García-Serrano and Hernanz (2002) show that workers holding temporary contracts are 
less likely to be employed in firms providing training, and once workers are employed in firms 
providing firm-based training, having a temporary contract also reduces the probability of being 
chosen to participate in training activities. Bentolila and Dolado (1994) analyse the Spanish 
situation and argue that the higher labour turnover derived from increased labour flexibility may 
have a negative impact on long-term productivity as they find a negative correlation between the 
capital-labour ratio and the proportion of temporary employment. The argument is that the short 
tenure inherent in temporary contracts discourages investment in human capital on the part of 
both firms and workers. Similarly, Jimeno and Toharia (1992) provide evidence of a negative 
correlation between temporary employment and productivity growth in Spanish manufacturing 
firms. More recently, Guell and Petrolongo (2003) offer new empirical evidence that supports 
this argument since they point out that in Spain, firms use fixed contracts as an alternative to the 
use of permanent contracts. They show that the rate of conversion of temporary contracts into 
permanent contracts decreased from 18% in 1987 to 5% in 1996 although it rose to 14% in 2001. 
The most evident effects of the surge of temporary employment from the equity point of view are 
higher worker and job turnover rates. This implies important negative effects, since job mobility 
tends to concentrate on the same group of workers
i. Some authors have expressed concern 
regarding the quality of the stock of jobs and the lack of opportunities for career advancement 
associated with temporary work (Farber, 1999; Araulampalan and Booth, 1998). The idea is that 
temporary jobs may be related to unstable jobs, which implies uncertainty in terms of the future 
income of the worker, especially when this situation persists for long time. Besides, this 
evolution towards a more flexible labour market has started to reduce unemployment without 
harming the so-called “insiders” who are protected by high job security. Hence, it has increased 
the dualism of the Spanish labour market (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Saint Paul, 1996, Toharia, 
2002). As segmented-market models demonstrate, there are two sectors within the labour market. 
On the one hand, a primary sector characterised by workers with permanent contracts and with a 
strong influence on the collective bargaining process. These have stable jobs, high wages and 
high chances of internal promotion. The secondary sector, on the other hand, consists of workers 
with fixed-term contracts, lower wages, low internal mobility and without presence in the 
bargaining process.  
Part of the recent literature on labour markets has focused on the study of the determinants of the 





























productivity and/or total labour costs. For instance, Wasmer (1999) extends the matching 
framework of Pissarides’ Equilibrium Unemployment Theory and proves that macroeconomic 
factors such as productivity growth and labour force growth have an impact on the relative 
demand for temporary contracts, beyond the need for staff flexibility. He shows that firms face a 
trade-off between paying high turnover costs and having stable workers, or paying low turnover 
costs but being more frequently engaged in the search process. In this context, higher 
productivity means higher expected profits, which induces further hiring today, since hiring costs 
indexed to productivity growth are lower if paid today. This is called the capitalization effect of 
growth and implies that when productivity growth is high, firms want to retain workers by 
offering them long-term contracts. This author evaluates the relative importance of productivity 
growth and shows that when this growth rate declines from 4% to 0% the share of short-term jobs 
increases from 0.5% to 10%. Dolado et al. (2002) use a basic dynamic model to offer a more 
detailed analysis of the determinants of the equilibrium ratio of temporary to permanent 
employment. They argue that the equilibrium ratio of temporary to permanent employees is 
mainly determined by the unit labour cost
ii differentials under each kind of contract, the elasticity 
of substitution between temporary and permanent workers, the volatility of labour demand along 
the business cycle and the average growth rate. We will base our empirical analysis on this model 
and test for the dependence of the probability of getting a permanent contract on unit labour 
costs. 
Before this, it is also interesting to highlight previous papers that analyse, from a theoretical 
perspective, the effectiveness of a labour market reform consisting of a reduction of firing costs 
in order to reduce the share of temporary workers (Blanchard and Landier, 2002; and Kugler, 
Jimeno and Hernanz 2002). Interestingly, Blanchard and Landier (2002) show that in countries 
with little employment protection, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
proportion of the workforce with fixed-term contracts is relatively low and fairly stable while in 
countries characterised by high levels of employment protection, such as Spain, France and Italy, 
the proportion of temporary workers doubled during the 1990s. Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz 
(2002) develop a simple dynamic matching model similar to Blanchard and Landier (2002) but 
they endogenize dismissals and introduce payroll taxes in order to analyse the Spanish labour 
market reform of 1997. In their model the demand for permanent and temporary employment 
depends on two productivity thresholds that depend, among other things, on dismissal costs and 
payroll taxes. The values of these thresholds are used to derive the steady-state values of 
temporary and permanent employment. Their model suggests that a reduction in dismissal costs 
for permanent workers increases hiring and firing and therefore has an ambiguous effect on 
unemployment. On the contrary, a reduction in firing costs for permanent contracts increases the 
rate of conversions from temporary to permanent contracts and reduces wage differentials. Their 
empirical results suggest that the reform of 1997 increased permanent employment probabilities 
for young workers as opposed to middle-aged workers. They also show increases in the relative 
transitions from unemployment to permanent employment for young and older men and from 
temporary to permanent employment for young men and women after the reform. The reason 





























payroll taxes increased both hiring and dismissals for older men, while in the case of young 
workers it had a positive effect on the hiring margin and little effect on dismissals. They estimate 
the elasticity of permanent employment to non-wage labour costs and find a fairly elastic 
response of permanent employment to non-wage labour costs for younger workers, for whom the 
payroll tax reduction was more important.  
Summarising, the achievement of labour market flexibility through the expansion of fixed-term 
contracts has not been as successful as was initially expected, since it has also brought about 
efficiency and equity costs. Theoretical models show that labour productivity and total labour 
costs influence the equilibrium permanent employment rate and therefore our purpose is to 
analyse whether regional differences in labour productivity and total labour costs are behind the 
observed differences in the permanent employment rate across Spanish regions. 
3  Data and descriptive statistics 
This paper uses three different data sources: the Spanish Labour Force Survey (Encuesta de 
Población Activa, EPA hereafter), the Regional Accounting Dataset (Contabilidad Regional de 
España, CRE hereafter) and the European Community Household Panel (ECHP, hereafter). 
These three databases offer us the two levels of information we need in our study, individual and 
region-industry data. The EPA has information regarding the personal and labour characteristics 
of individuals while from the CRE we derive information regarding the production characteristics 
of the sector and the location where the individual works. Finally, since the EPA does not offer 
earnings information we use the ECHP to control for the earnings differential between temporary 
and permanent jobs.  
Our sample includes individuals surveyed between 1995 and 2001, covering more than a full 
cycle of the Spanish economy. We have selected non-farm employed workers between 16 and 65 
years of age and have excluded the self-employed. Given that the EPA has a rotating structure 
that follows individuals for a maximum of six quarters, replacing one-sixth of the sample every 
quarter, our sample has a panel structure.  
The  CRE provides annual information on production, employment and total labour costs by 
sector and region. From this database we take the value added at constant prices, total and 
salaried employment and total labour costs
iii, and construct several aggregate indicators by sector 
and region. We distinguish eight non-farm productive sectors: Energy, Manufacturing Industry, 
Construction, Commerce and Hotels, Transport and Communications, Financial Services, 
Professional Services and Other Non-market Services. Apparent labour productivity is measured 
as the ratio of value added at constant prices and total employment. The total labour costs per 
employee are calculated as the ratio of total labour costs to salaried employment. The unit labour 
costs are calculated as the ratio of current labour compensation per employee to labour 
productivity measured in constant prices. We use this variable in our analysis because it takes 
into account labour productivity differentials in comparison to labour costs. For instance, an 





























the competitive position of the region-sector deteriorates. From this database we also construct 
indicators of the regional sector specialisation. 
The ECHP is based on a survey that is carried out annually of a sample of European households, 
including Spain. It has a panel dimension so it allows the history of individuals during the life of 
the survey to be followed. Individuals' personal, labour and economic information is obtained, 
together with various characteristics of the household. Most of these variables describe the 
individual's and household’s situation at the moment of the interview, including labour earnings. 
This database provides an estimation of individual wages which will be used to compute the 
wage gap between permanent and temporary employees.  
1.  Table 1: Percentage of Permanent Contracts by regions 1995-2001 (EPA) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  1995-2001* 
Spain  65.5% 66.4% 66.9% 67.2% 67.1% 67.9% 68.5%  3.0% 
Andalusia  60.8% 61.1% 61.4% 59.9% 57.5% 58.5% 59.1%  -1.8% 
Aragon  70.9% 71.5% 71.1% 71.5% 72.8% 73.4% 74.4%  4.7% 
Asturias  76.4% 74.9% 76.2% 75.6% 72.8% 72.8% 73.1%  -3.5% 
Balearic Islands  67.0%  69.1%  70.1% 70.3% 71.8% 71.3% 70.1%  3.9% 
Canary Islands  55.8%  56.6%  58.8% 58.9% 61.9% 63.9% 61.2%  5.7% 
Cantabria  69.3% 70.4% 71.0% 73.1% 71.6% 71.5% 74.0%  3.7% 
Castilla-León 69.6%  70.9%  72.1%  72.6% 72.3% 73.1% 73.9%  4.2% 
Castilla-La Mancha  59.1%  62.5%  63.1% 61.9% 62.8% 64.1% 65.7%  7.5% 
Catalonia  65.1% 65.7% 67.4% 69.1% 69.3% 71.2% 72.9%  9.7% 
Valencia  57.9% 59.8% 60.6% 62.1% 63.0% 65.3% 64.2%  7.0% 
Extremadura  67.9% 70.5% 69.4% 67.8% 66.3% 65.9% 65.1%  -1.8% 
Galicia  68.2% 67.6% 66.0% 67.7% 66.8% 66.1% 67.1%  -1.2% 
Madrid  77.8% 77.7% 77.2% 77.8% 78.9% 78.1% 79.5%  1.4% 
Murcia  62.3% 62.7% 61.5% 62.8% 61.8% 62.5% 62.9%  1.1% 
Navarra  70.1% 73.5% 74.3% 74.3% 75.7% 74.1% 74.9%  4.6% 
Basque Country  67.5%  68.8%  67.9% 68.9% 68.0% 68.9% 69.6%  2.5% 
Rioja  73.5% 70.2% 69.0% 72.6% 73.0% 75.1% 77.3%  4.1% 
*Differences in percentage points 
3.1 Descriptive  Analysis 
We start our descriptive analysis by considering the trends in the percentage of permanent 
contracts for Spain during the period 1995-2001 (Table 1)
iv. We observe that the permanent 
employment rate increased slightly by around 3 percentage points. Consequently, despite the 
institutional labour reforms of the 1990s and the economic upturn of the period, in 2001 Spain 
still had a low permanent employment rate compared to the European average.  
To illustrate the regional dispersion we represent the percentage of permanent contracts for each 
region in the years 1995 and 2001 (Figure 1). Those regions located over the black line 
experienced a positive growth in permanent employment while those located under the black line 
experienced a negative change. As can be seen, the southern and eastern regions have the lowest 
permanent employment rate. Within this group we can distinguish those that have an increasing 
trend such as Castilla-La Mancha, Valencia, Murcia and the Canary Islands, from those whose 
position has even worsened, such as Andalusia and Extremadura. On the opposite side, we find 
that the northern regions and Madrid have the highest permanent employment rate. The 





























lower than the national average. This Figure also shows that the dispersion in the permanent 
employment rate hardly decreases during the period analysed: the difference between the 
minimum and the maximum permanent employment rate remains around 20 percentage points, 
and the relative position of each region has hardly changed. These results show that the national 
permanent employment rate conceals regions with low and high rates of permanent employment. 
Our intention is to ascertain whether these differences may reflect divergences in the steady state 
composition of employment by type of contract across regions.  
1.  Figure2: 
































Table 2: Percentage of permanent contracts by personal characteristics, Spanish Regions (average 1995-2001, EPA) 
 Age  Gender  Studies 
 18-24  25-30 
 
40-55  55-65 Men  Woman
No 





Spain 29.6%  66.1%  83.3%  88.0%  68.8% 64.6%  62.8%  63.3%  66.9%  77.4%  75.9% 
Andalusia 32.6%  57.1%  78.3%  85.0%  60.8% 57.6% 55.8% 53.1%  59.9%  76.4%  72.9% 
Aragon 34.4%  72.3%  86.6%  90.7%  74.8% 68.3%  69.3%  70.7%  71.3%  77.7%  76.9% 
Asturias 31.5%  70.3%  89.8%  90.5%  75.4% 72.7%  82.0%  72.0%  73.3%  83.9%  77.9% 
Balearic Islands  34.3%  73.8%  84.1%  89.7%  58.9% 61.2% 73.0% 69.2%  66.2%  80.7%  76.2% 
Canary Islands  25.0%  58.7%  77.8%  87.5%  61.1% 58.5% 63.9% 53.9%  60.2%  75.4%  71.6% 
Cantabria 27.2%  67.0%  89.5%  93.3%  72.8% 70.3% 74.3% 79.1%  69.9%  69.8%  82.9% 
Castilla-León 30.3%  69.5%  87.7% 90.4%  73.8% 69.4% 63.9% 69.9%  70.7% 79.6% 77.0% 
Castilla-La Mancha  28.3%  63.9% 79.6% 84.2%  63.5% 60.2% 53.1% 56.6%  65.5% 77.9% 74.9% 
Catalonia 31.3%  71.9%  83.6%  88.2%  70.7% 66.2% 71.1% 65.6%  67.5%  77.9%  76.9% 
Valencia 27.1%  63.8%  77.6%  82.5%  63.9% 58.5%  60.9%  57.3%  62.9%  72.7%  71.2% 
Extremadura 37.9%  66.6%  81.4%  87.1%  67.2% 67.9%  61.2%  61.6%  68.4%  79.7%  80.1% 
Galicia 26.2%  65.1%  82.3%  90.4%  67.8% 66.4% 71.6% 63.0%  65.1%  77.6%  76.7% 
Madrid 44.8%  77.3%  90.2%  93.6%  78.9% 75.6%  78.0%  76.3%  76.3%  82.1%  83.3% 
Murcia 26.2%  63.8%  80.8%  90.2%  63.8% 59.2%  63.0%  57.9%  60.2%  76.4%  71.4% 
Navarra 34.8%  72.5%  90.1%  94.3%  76.7% 70.3%  80.9%  75.5%  73.4%  74.3%  68.9% 
Basque Country  24.1%  65.8%  87.6%  89.5%  72.8% 63.5% 79.9% 70.6%  64.9%  73.5%  67.1% 






























Firstly, we compute the regional rate of permanent contracts based on different personal and 
labour characteristics (Table 2) and employer characteristics (Table 3) to ascertain whether 
differences in the composition of the workforce may be behind the observed dispersion in the 
permanent employment rate across regions. In general terms, it appears that permanent 
employment is less prevalent among women, less educated workers and youths. Especially 
relevant is the difference in the permanent employment rate by age: the highest rate of 
temporality is found for young workers; their percentage of permanent contracts is well below 
40% for all regions except Madrid. This type of contract is also less intensively used in private 
and small firms and in low skill occupations. These descriptive statistics, as stated in previous 
empirical studies (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; García and Rebollo 2005), show that temporary 
employment especially affects certain groups of workers, such as newly employed workers with 
low educational attainments in small private firms, but not the core of permanent employees.  
Table 3: Percentage of permanent contracts by labour characteristics, Spanish Regions (average 1995-2001, EPA) 
 Firm  Size  Occupation  Skill  Hours  of work  Firm’s Ownership 
 Small  Medium  Big  High  Medium Low  Full-Time Part-Time  Public   Private  
Spain 59.6%  68.3%  79.6%  80.1% 68.8%  59.2%  69.2%  43.8%  86.6%  70.9% 
Andalusia 67.6%  72.1%  80.3%  78.8% 62.3%  48.9%  62.4%  32.1%  79.9%  51.7% 
Aragon 49.6%  63.0%  76.2%  80.8% 73.1%  66.9%  74.7%  53.5%  83.9%  68.5% 
Asturias 66.6%  73.1%  83.3%  85.9% 71.4%  70.9%  75.9%  52.0%  87.9%  69.2% 
Balearic Islands  67.3%  76.8%  79.1%  81.0% 72.2%  63.2%  71.7%  56.5%  85.2%  66.8% 
Canary Islands  53.0%  63.7%  70.8%  76.9% 63.9%  59.2%  61.4%  39.3%  77.6%  54.1% 
Cantabria 64.0%  72.7%  82.8%  82.3% 70.1%  67.9%  73.1%  51.2%  82.9%  68.4% 
Castilla-León 64.3%  72.5%  82.7% 81.9% 73.9%  65.7% 74.6% 48.1%  84.0%  67.0% 
Castilla-La Mancha  56.3%  63.9%  77.6% 53.1% 56.6% 65.5%  64.9%  42.4%  78.9%  56.% 
Catalonia 61.3%  71.9%  78.6%  80.1% 71.6%  51.5%  71.9%  43.7%  82.9%  66.3% 
Valencia 58.1%  64.8%  72.6%  80.9% 68.3%  63.9%  63.7%  43.6%  78.2%  58.5% 
Extremadura 63.9%  73.6%  80.4%  76.2% 64.6%  54.4%  69.7%  44.1%  76.1%  62.2% 
Galicia 61.2%  68.1%  77.3%  82.6% 73.0%  55.1%  68.6%  50.1%  83.7%  61.7% 
Madrid 71.8%  78.3%  85.2%  86.0% 77.3%  71.3%  79.1%  50.5%  90.8%  74.2% 
Murcia 55.2%  66.8%  75.8%  77.0% 65.9%  53.2%  64.4%  41.8%  82.4%  56.1% 
Navarra 70.8%  77.5%  80.1%  78.9% 72.5%  71.4%  75.3%  60.1%  77.9%  72.9% 
Basque Country  57.1%  72.8%  79.6% 75.9% 65.6%  65.9%  71.5%  38.4%  65.1%  79.8% 
Rioja 72.2%  69.0%  78.1%  83.1% 74.8%  71.5%  74.1%  51.9%  85.5%  69.9% 
 
Secondly, in Table 4 we present the time series of permanent employment by sector from 1995 to 
2001. They confirm that the relative specialisation of each region partially explains the dispersion 
of the permanent employment rate across regions. There are sectors such as Construction and 
Commerce and Hotels where the permanent employment rate is, independently of the region, 
below the average. It is striking that in the Construction sector the permanent employment rate 
tends to be about 20-30 percentage points lower than the national average. On the contrary, 
sectors such as Energy and Financial Services present the highest permanent employment rate in 
all cases. We also consider whether regions with negative growth in the permanent employment 
rate share certain common dynamics. However, we conclude that there do not appear to be any 
such common patterns, except to the extent that these regions have a negative change in the 





























2.  Table 4: Percentage of Permanent Contracts by sector 1995-2001 (EPA) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  1995-2001* 
Energy  82.0% 84.7% 84.4% 81.7% 82.2% 81.8% 86.6%  4.6% 
Industry  68.2% 69.3% 68.2% 69.4% 70.7% 72.1% 73.2%  5.0% 
Construction    34.2% 34.7% 35.2% 36.9% 36.0% 39.3% 41.3%  7.1% 
Commerce  and  Hotels  55.3% 57.0% 58.4% 60.5% 63.5% 65.8% 67.3%  12.0% 
Transp.  and  Comm.  76.8% 76.4% 75.0% 76.3% 75.9% 74.1% 75.6%  -0.8% 
Financial  Servs.  88.6% 89.4% 88.8% 88.2% 88.4% 88.4% 88.0%  0.6% 
Prof.  Services  56.3% 58.4% 59.3% 62.6% 67.8% 68.2% 68.1%  12.2% 
Other  Services  75.8% 76.6% 77.8% 76.9% 74.5% 74.2% 73.3%  -2.5% 
*Differences in percentage points 
 
Table 5 displays the relative sector specialization by region. We expect that those regions highly 
specialised in activities characterised by a low permanent employment rate, such as Construction 
and Commerce and Hotels, will have lower rates of permanent employment. For instance, the 
southern regions specialise in the Construction sector and also face high rates of temporality. 
Andalusia, Murcia, the Canary Islands and Valencia also specialise in Commerce and Hotels. On 
the contrary, regions with a higher permanent employment rate, such as Rioja, Navarra, Aragon 
and Madrid, do not specialise in these sectors.  
3.  Table 5: Relative sector specialisation, 1995-2001 EPA 








Services  Other Services
  1995 2001 1995 2001 1995 2001  1995  2001 1995 2001 1995 2001 1995  2001 1995 2001 
Andalusia  0.77 0.84 0.66 0.66 1.09 1.19  1.07  1.04 0.96 0.90 0.97 0.98 0.91 0.92 1.18 1.15 
Aragon  1.38 1.11 1.21 1.29 0.86 0.74  0.85  0.88 0.90 0.77 1.06 0.94 0.98 0.95 0.97 1.02 
Asturias  3.56 3.46 0.91 0.94 0.79 0.99  0.95  0.94 1.24 1.02 0.92 1.01 0.80 0.82 0.99 0.99 
Balearic  Islands  0.90 0.97 0.46 0.40 0.88 1.29  1.87  1.66 1.56 1.42 0.91 0.91 1.14 0.86 0.75 0.81 
Canary  Islands  0.88 0.74 0.35 0.29 1.01 1.24  1.58  1.62 1.31 1.37 0.69 0.62 1.00 1.01 1.05 0.95 
Cantabria  1.17 1.20 1.26 1.12 1.16 0.98  0.87  1.01 0.77 0.93 0.55 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.93 0.94 
Castilla-León 1.73  1.77  0.92 0.99 1.04 0.97 0.85 0.78  0.97  0.98 0.91 0.95 0.88 0.82 1.09 1.15 
Castilla-La Mancha  0.71  0.73  1.01 1.00 1.52 1.24  0.75  0.81 0.85 0.86 1.92 0.92 0.72 0.71 1.05 1.11 
Catalonia  0.91 0.76 1.24 1.31 0.86 0.89  1.01  0.98 0.89 1.01 1.04 1.09 1.20 1.11 0.85 0.81 
Valencia  0.47 0.59 1.41 1.34 0.87 0.97  1.06  1.09 0.90 0.89 1.01 0.81 0.99 0.95 0.76 0.78 
Extremadura  1.43 1.28 0.39 0.50 1.55 1.34  0.98  0.92 0.69 0.61 1.02 1.18 0.71 0.63 1.31 1.36 
Galicia  1.10 1.44 0.93 1.03 1.17 1.07  1.00  0.92 1.06 0.93 1.03 0.89 0.83 0.82 0.99 1.03 
Madrid  0.74 0.87 0.80 0.73 0.75 0.73  0.80  0.85 1.62 1.68 1.62 1.66 1.67 2.04 1.06 0.96 
Murcia  0.84 1.03 1.04 0.99 1.13 1.15  1.09  1.20 0.93 0.74 0.52 0.77 0.81 0.86 0.96 0.91 
Navarra  0.69 0.66 1.65 1.56 0.73 0.61  0.73  0.74 0.47 0.68 1.12 1.09 0.78 0.77 0.93 1.04 
Basque  Country  0.54 0.48 1.47 1.49 0.69 0.57  0.75  0.83 0.92 0.99 0.86 0.96 1.17 1.14 0.95 0.93 
Rioja  0.39 0.34 1.97 1.70 0.66 0.70  0.75  0.85 0.47 0.49 1.37 1.30 0.64 0.77 0.74 0.87 
 
Finally, we consider whether the increase in unit labour costs may partially explain the small 
change in the permanent employment rate. We focus on unit labour costs because they are a 
better indicator of business profitability than total labour compensation alone and are the most 
crucial component of the cost of doing business within a geographical region. Unit labour costs 
measure labour compensation relative to labour productivity. Therefore, firms with large unit 
labour costs will find it more profitable to hire temporary workers, all other things being equal. 





























labour costs rose by 10.3 percentage points. This ratio corresponds to an average annual rate of 
change of around 1.4 percentage points. When labour productivity increases less than total 
compensation per employee, unit labour costs increase.  
4.  Table 6: Unit labour cost by region 1995-2001 (CRE) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  1995-2001
* 1995-2001
** 
Spain  57.1% 60.6% 61.6% 63.2% 65.0% 66.2% 67.3%  1.47%  10.3% 
Andalusia  57.5% 59.9% 62.0% 63.0% 64.8% 65.7% 66.1%  1.23%  8.6% 
Aragon  58.5% 61.9% 63.0% 65.4% 67.1% 68.2% 68.5%  1.43%  10.0% 
Asturias  58.8% 61.1% 63.6% 64.8% 66.4% 67.4% 68.7%  1.41%  9.9% 
Balearic Islands  58.4%  61.6%  63.7%  66.3% 67.6% 69.9% 70.9%  1.79%  12.5% 
Canary  Islands  58.0% 61.9% 63.0% 64.1% 65.3% 65.9% 66.8%  1.26%  8.8% 
Cantabria  57.5% 60.8% 62.2% 65.2% 68.3% 68.7% 69.3%  1.69%  11.8% 
Castilla-León 56.9%  61.3% 61.7% 63.3% 64.9% 66.9% 66.8%  1.41%  9.9% 
Castilla-La Mancha  55.7%  60.1%  59.9%  61.2% 62.4% 63.4% 64.2% 1.21%  8.5% 
Catalonia  57.1% 59.9% 61.6% 63.6% 65.4% 67.4% 68.8%  1.67%  11.7% 
Valencia  56.9% 60.6% 61.4% 62.5% 63.8% 64.9% 66.5%  1.37%  9.6% 
Extremadura  58.6% 62.9% 63.8% 65.4% 67.6% 68.6% 69.8%  1.60%  11.2% 
Galicia  55.0% 59.6% 60.4% 62.4% 63.7% 65.0% 65.2%  1.46%  10.2% 
Madrid  59.2% 60.0% 61.8% 62.7% 64.8% 67.0% 68.6%  1.34%  9.4% 
Murcia  54.1% 58.8% 59.3% 60.7% 62.0% 63.2% 64.9%  1.54%  10.8% 
Navarra  55.1% 59.6% 59.0% 60.1% 60.9% 62.8% 65.9%  1.54%  10.8% 
Basque  Country  57.3% 60.5% 61.7% 62.4% 64.9% 65.7% 67.5%  1.46%  10.2% 
Rioja  55.5% 58.5% 59.3% 61.9% 64.6% 64.8% 66.6%  1.59%  11.1% 
*Average annual growth rate 
** Difference in percentage points 
 
To ascertain which component is responsible for the increase in unit labour costs we present in 
Tables 7 and 8 the apparent labour productivity and the total labour costs per employee 
respectively. On average, the annual growth rate of apparent labour productivity has been fairly 
low, at around 0.4%. The total compensation per worker has the same dynamic as unit labour 
costs since it progressively increased during the period at an annual rate of 3.1% in average 
terms. Hence, the increase in workers’ total labour compensation combined with the low 
productivity growth pushed up unit labour costs during the second half of the 1990s. 
5.  Table 7:  Apparent Labour Productivity, Spain 1995=100 (constant prices, CRE) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  1995-2001
* 1995-2001
** 
Spain  100 101 102 102 102 103 103  0.4%  3.0% 
Andalusia  94 95 95 95 94 94 94  0.0%  0.0% 
Aragon  99  100 101 101 103 104 105  0.9%  6.1% 
Asturias  96 97 97 99 99 99  101 0.7%  5.2% 
Balearic  Islands  113 112 113 111 113 109 108  -0.6%  -4.4% 
Canary  Islands  99 98 97 96 95 96 97 -0.3% -2.0% 
Cantabria  102 101 102 102 103 102 102  0.0%  0.0% 
Castilla-León 95  97  99  99  101 103 103  1.2%  8.4% 
Castilla-La Mancha  90  90  92 91 93 94 94 0.6%  4.4% 
Catalonia  108 108 108 107 107 109 110  0.3%  1.9% 
Valencia  92 92 93 93 93 94 95  0.5%  3.3% 
Extremadura  77 79 84 83 82 82 83  1.1%  7.8% 
Galicia  77 78 81 82 84 84 86  1.7% 11.7% 
Madrid  116 119 119 121 121 121 121  0.6%  4.3% 
Murcia  89 90 89 88 88 90 90  0.2%  1.1% 
Navarra  110 112 115 113 115 116 115  0.6%  4.5% 
Basque  Country  115 115 117 118 118 120 120  0.6%  4.3% 
Rioja  99  103 107 110 107 110 107  1.2%  8.1% 





























** Difference in percentage points 
6.  Table 8: Total Compensation by Worker, Spain 1995=100 (current prices, CRE) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  1995-2001
* 1995-2001
** 
Spain  100 104 107 110 113 117 122  3.1%  21.9% 
Andalusia 91  93  95  97  100  103  106  2.3%  16.1% 
Aragon  102 108 109 112 116 120 125  3.2%  22.2% 
Asturias  104 107 110 114 116 120 123  2.7%  18.6% 
Balearic  Islands  102 107 112 114 117 120 124  3.1%  21.5% 
Canary  Islands  98  102 104 106 107 111 115  2.5%  17.2% 
Cantabria  102 107 111 115 120 123 127  3.5%  24.5% 
Castilla-León 96  102  104  108  112 117 122  3.8%  26.7% 
Castilla-La Mancha  87  92  92 95 99  103  107 3.3% 23.0% 
Catalonia  106 111 113 117 119 124 130  3.2%  22.4% 
Valencia  89  94  97  100 101 105 110  3.4%  23.9% 
Extremadura  78 84 86 89 91 95 99  3.8% 26.8% 
Galicia 87  94  96  98  101  103  108  3.4%  23.6% 
Madrid  115 119 123 128 131 136 142  3.3%  23.1% 
Murcia  83 88 89 90 93 98  103 3.4% 24.0% 
Navarra  109 118 120 124 126 132 138  3.8%  26.4% 
Basque  Country  118 123 126 130 134 139 143  3.1%  21.6% 
Rioja  96  102 105 110 114 120 126  4.5%  31.4% 
*Average annual growth rate 
** Difference in percentage points 
 
If the argument holds that low productivity and large unit labour costs explain the minimal 
decline in temporary employment then those regions with larger unit labour costs or a larger 
increase in these costs should experience lower growth rates of permanent employment. 
However, regional productivity is highly dependent on regional output composition, and 
therefore to study the relationship between unit labour costs and permanent employment it is 
necessary to analyse each sector separately across regions. In Table 9 we display unit labour costs 
by sector and region. The difference is considerable across sectors and less so, but still important, 
across regions. The negative correlation between unit labour costs and the permanent 
employment rate clearly holds for Construction, since this sector faces high unit labour costs and 
a low permanent employment rate. The exception is the sector Other Services. It displays large 
unit labour costs and a high permanent employment rate due to the fact that this category covers 
the public sector, which is traditionally characterised by high rates of permanent employment.  
All things considered, we argue that a compelling explanation of the observed divergences in 
regional employment composition by type of contract should focus on differences in steady state 
variables such as regional output composition and unit labour costs. The descriptive statistics 
already presented suggest that the sector composition partially explains the observed regional 
differences in employment composition by type of contract. The question arises whether besides 
this sector composition effect, differences in unit labour costs and therefore in productivity are 
also behind the observed behaviour. The evidence just presented, while suggestive, is too general 
to be conclusive. In the next section we offer an analysis based on individual data.  





























8.   
9.  Table 9: Unit labour cost by sector-region (CRE) 








Services Other  Services
  1995 2001 1995 2001 1995 2001  1995  2001 1995 2001 1995 2001 1995  2001 1995 2001 
Spain  30.5% 24.3% 67.7% 79.7% 71.1% 91.8% 54.3%  68.5% 63.0% 66.5% 55.9% 58.6% 33.4% 48.5% 84.6% 102.1%
Andalusia  30.4% 26.6% 66.7% 78.1% 72.1% 92.3% 57.3%  68.5% 64.0% 65.8% 56.0% 55.3% 28.9% 41.3% 84.6% 100.8%
Aragon  30.3% 19.3% 67.2% 81.1% 73.6% 92.7% 51.9%  68.6% 61.1% 69.3% 64.2% 69.5% 33.3% 43.2% 86.2% 104.5%
Asturias  49.0% 39.0% 68.2% 80.0% 68.3% 88.9% 57.8%  70.4% 64.4% 73.9% 49.0% 54.5% 30.9% 42.6% 83.0% 100.6%
Balearic  Islands  31.2% 27.4% 71.3% 90.9% 75.4%  112.7% 51.3%  71.9% 63.9% 67.5% 61.0% 59.4% 32.1% 41.0% 81.1% 96.4%
Canary  Islands  28.7% 28.2% 68.7% 78.5% 63.4% 81.2% 52.6%  71.8% 67.2% 72.9% 63.7% 54.3% 33.6% 45.8% 86.5% 101.6%
Cantabria  35.1% 27.5% 67.6% 83.0% 79.7% 93.6% 57.0%  82.7% 59.0% 67.9% 51.0% 57.4% 25.2% 36.6% 85.4% 105.4%
Castilla-León 34.2%  23.9%  64.5% 73.3% 74.3% 94.1% 53.3% 67.3% 63.9% 70.9% 52.8% 60.6% 26.0% 38.1% 86.0% 106.4%
Castilla-La Mancha 24.0%  21.5%  72.4% 84.1% 67.6% 82.1% 54.2% 60.4% 58.4% 65.0% 58.5% 65.0% 25.1% 33.8% 85.7% 101.8%
Catalonia  24.6% 21.1% 66.0% 77.6% 69.0% 96.7% 56.0%  69.8% 65.3% 66.3% 53.4% 59.5% 38.4% 56.9% 84.0% 102.5%
Valencia  25.5% 21.3% 67.9% 81.9% 79.1% 94.1% 52.2%  69.7% 60.1% 64.8% 58.9% 52.7% 30.3% 47.4% 81.2% 100.3%
Extremadura  24.6% 20.5% 80.5% 96.8% 69.3% 96.5% 54.9%  67.8% 64.9% 68.9% 62.9% 70.2% 26.7% 34.0% 85.1% 103.7%
Galicia  24.9% 18.1% 70.2% 82.4% 66.6% 88.0% 51.7%  62.8% 60.2% 65.9% 57.1% 63.2% 26.0% 41.9% 83.4% 99.2%
Madrid  27.7% 23.6% 68.4% 78.3% 72.2% 90.2% 53.4%  70.6% 67.3% 61.6% 55.0% 58.6% 46.2% 64.5% 83.7% 101.3%
Murcia  24.2% 23.5% 70.5% 85.3% 63.5% 88.7% 54.8%  67.1% 56.1% 58.9% 55.7% 58.6% 25.7% 37.2% 82.4% 99.8%
Navarra  28.0% 27.5% 63.8% 75.7% 69.2% 96.4% 52.1%  61.4% 56.4% 61.9% 50.5% 50.8% 34.4% 48.9% 86.3% 105.0%
Basque  Country  24.9% 20.9% 68.7% 79.3% 75.5% 92.4% 56.9%  67.5% 59.0% 65.8% 43.5% 47.4% 43.9% 63.5% 86.2% 103.4%
Rioja  27.2% 18.0% 66.7% 79.2% 68.0% 86.4% 50.1%  67.3% 56.9% 63.4% 62.7% 71.4% 26.2% 42.5% 86.0% 104.4%
 
4  The Probability of having a permanent contract: an individual analysis 
The main hypothesis is that unit labour costs partially explain the minimal change in the share of 
permanent contracts over total employment during the period 1995-2001 and are behind the 
observed differences in the permanent employment rate across regions. These observed 
differences in unit labour costs may be related to differences in productive specialisation or 
differences in the unit labour costs within productive sectors. In the first case, we should observe 
that regions specialising in sectors with high labour costs tend to have a larger rate of 
temporality. In the second place, we should observe that, once the sector of the contract is 
considered, regional unit labour costs are still negatively related to the permanent employment 
rate.  
This exercise entails the estimation of a model determining the individual probability of being 
employed under a permanent contract over the period 1995-2001. We assume that there is an 
underlying response variable defined by the following linear regression relationship: 
(1) 
*
kijt kijt ijt kijt xz β γε Τ= + +       (1) 
where k stands for individuals, i for regions, j for sectors and t for years; the matrix xkijt contains 
covariates that vary among individuals and are related to personal and labour characteristics; zijt 
stands for covariates specific to the sector and region where the individual works; and finally εkijt 





























(2)  kijt kij ij kijt ε ωω υ =+ +      (2) 
where  ωkij describes the individual effect, ωij the sector-region aggregate effect and υkijt the 
random error term of the model. We assume that the random component υkijt is independent of 
both the individual and sector-region effects.  
In practice 
*
kijt Τ is not observed, and what we observe is the dummy variable Tkijt defined by: 
(3) 
* 10





      (3) 
That is, Tkijt is a variable that takes value one if the individual has a permanent contract and zero 
otherwise. From equations (1) and (3) we obtain that: 
(4)  ( ) ( ) Pr( 1) Pr kijt kijt kijt ijt kijt ijt x zF x z εβ γ β γ Τ== > + = +  (4) 
One way to estimate the model parameters is to include dummy variables for the individual 
effects and then maximize the unconditional likelihood function. However, the unconditional 
maximum-likelihood estimator is consistent as T→∞ for fixed N but inconsistent as N→∞ for 
fixed T. This inconsistency arises because the number of the so-called incidental parameters 
increases without limit, while the amount of information regarding each incidental parameter 
remains fixed. This inconsistency also arises for the rest of parameters (Wooldrige, 2004). 
Therefore, if we select the fixed effect specification we should use the conditional maximum 
likelihood estimator. From a theoretical perspective, the selection of the random effects model 
over the conditional fixed effects model depends on the likelihood of the assumptions for each 
particular case and its relative accuracy may be tested by means of the Hausman test. 
Nonetheless, there are certain methodological considerations specific to the type of analysis 
presented in this paper that support the selection of the random effects estimation. The maximum 
likelihood estimation of the fixed effects model is unaffected by variables with time-invariant 
response and, more importantly, it excludes all observations with a time invariant dependent 
variable. This would lead, in our case, to a drastic reduction in the sample size (from 1,255,768 to 
98,307 observations) and we would end up with a new sample with significantly different sample 
means for all the regressors as we omit all workers in permanent jobs: i) the average probability 
of getting a permanent contract is around 73% for the whole sample and this probability 
decreases to 48% for the sample composed using only observations with a time variant dependent 
variable; ii) the sample size drops to 8% of the total sample and the probability of transitions 
from temporary to permanent contracts is 66%. This demonstrates that the results derived from 
the fixed effect estimator may be biased by sample selection. For instance, if we follow the fixed 
effect approach we omit unemployed workers whose probability of getting a temporary contract 
is higher than workers already employed, ceteris paribus. Certainly, for studies focusing on the 





























but this is not the aim of this paper, since we are comparing the pool of permanent workers with 
the pool of temporary ones. 
On the other hand, we are interested in measuring the effects of several aggregate variables on 
the probability of obtaining a permanent contract. With the fixed effects model we may control 
for the individual “fixed effect” but the model may still have the aggregate regional effects, 
which will still bias the variables of interest. That is, with the fixed effects estimator we can only 
consistently estimate the parameter vector β but we are especially interested in consistently 
estimating the parameter vector γ . 
Following Chamberlain (1980), we allow the unobservable variables to be correlated with certain 
elements of the covariates. A Mundlak version (1978) of Chamberlain’s assumption is to 
parameterise the aggregate unobserved heterogeneity as a linear projection of the mean of the 
time varying variables
v. In our case, this implies parameterising the aggregate region-sector 
specific effects as a linear projection on the mean of the time varying variables at the individual 
and region-sector level respectively. The underlying assumption is that the group mean is a 
sufficient statistic for estimating the unobserved effect specific to the corresponding level 
(Wooldrige, 2004). The resulting slope estimators are not a function of these unobserved effects, 
which implies that they are consistent. By using this formulation, Mundlak (1978) maintains that 
the difference between the fixed and random effects approach is based on incorrect specification. 
Hence, we specify these covariates as follows: 
(5)  ij ij ij Z ω πν =+        ( 5 )  
(6)  kij kij kij X ω θν =+        ( 6 )  
where Zij and Xkij represent average covariates over time at the aggregate and individual level 
respectively.  
Another technical problem may arise from the combination of individual-specific variables and 
aggregate variables. Moulton (1990) demonstrated the serious biases that can result from 
estimating the effects of aggregate explanatory variables on individual-specific variables. The 
source of these biases in the standard errors is the presence of an unobserved aggregate-level 
effect in the error term. However, with Mundlak’s correction we consider that we already control 
for this type of bias, since by conditioning on group variables the estimation is purged of any 
correlation between explanatory variables and group effects. Therefore, after evaluating this 
methodological trade-off between the fixed and the random effects estimator, we opted for the 
random effects specification. Hence, substituting equations (5) and (6) into (2) and (3) gives:  
(7)  () ( ) Pr 1 kijt kijt kij ijt ij Fx X z Z βθγ π Τ== + + +    (7) 





























The econometric issue is to consistently estimate the effect of the aggregate explanatory variables 
(zijt, Zij) on the probability of having a permanent contract, controlling for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity. The sample used in the estimation includes all individuals aged from 
18 to 64 who were employed in non-farming sectors, excluding those always unemployed and 
out of the labour force. The dependent variable takes value one if the worker has a job with a 
permanent contract and zero if employed under a temporary contract. Since the aim of our project 
is to measure the effect of unit labour costs on the probability of getting a permanent contract we 
include this variable as the main covariate in our model. We expect that the probability of 
obtaining a permanent contract is greater in sector-regions with lower unit labour costs. In order 
to effectively reflect the effects of unit labour costs on this probability we also add the size of the 
sector in which the worker obtains the contract. This variable is measured as the share of 
employment for each region-sector relative to total employment within the region. The idea is 
that the probability of obtaining permanent employment is higher for those sectors that absorb a 
high percentage of regional employment, but at the same time may have low productivity levels.  
Our specification also includes several personal and labour characteristics such as age, gender, 
educational attainment, and dummies for occupation, firm size, seasonal job, full time job and 
private firm’s ownership. Besides, we include time and regional dummy variables. The year 
effects reflect the impact of macro shocks affecting the probability of obtaining a permanent job. 
We also include regional dummies to estimate the average elasticity of the rate of permanent 
contracts to unit labour costs conditional on the regional level. Additionally, we compute the 
wage gap between temporary and permanent employees from the ECHP and include it as a 
regressor to test whether unit labour costs still play a role in explaining the divergences across the 
regional permanent employment rate once wage differentials are accounted for. In all models we 
also control for the regional relative sector specialisation, and therefore the estimated effects of 
the regional dummy variables will be conditional on this set of covariates.  
4.1 Main  Results 
The estimated coefficients describe the determinants of the probability of having a permanent 
contract in Spain during the period 1995-2001. We present several specifications (Table 11) to 
confirm the robustness of the results, but Models 1 and 2 are our main reference. In the first 
column we present the simplest model described by equation (1), while in the second column we 
introduce Mundlak’s correction by adding time average individual and aggregate covariates as 
described in equation (7). Since these covariates are considered to reflect the existence of non-
varying time effects, we will interpret them as describing permanent or long run effects. In the 
last two rows we provide the value of the likelihood function and the parameter that measures the 
total variance contributed by the panel level variance component in order to test the panel data 
estimation instead of the pooled estimation. Its value and its standard error show that we cannot 





























level variance component is unimportant, and the panel estimator is the same as the pooled 










where α represents the random effect component and ε  the traditional random error. 
The signs of the parameters of the personal and labour characteristics are common to the 
empirical literature, so we only briefly comment on them. We obtain a large and statistically 
significant effect on permanent employment probabilities for the highly educated, men and 
middle-aged workers. Moreover, full-time workers in non-seasonal activities and in public firms 
also have a high probability of obtaining a permanent contract. The negative effect of the firm 
size is not as expected, since the statistical analysis reveals that permanent employment is less 
common in small firms. However another covariate of the model is the percentage of small firms 
within the sector and region, which shows the expected negative effect on the probability of 
having a permanent contract. Another interesting result concerns the private firm variable. 
According to Model 1 the probability of obtaining a permanent contract is greater when working 
in a public firm, but this effect changes when we look at Model 2, where time average effects are 
included. In this second specification the short-run effect of this variable is positive while the 
fixed or long-term effect is negative. We interpret this result as confirmation that the rate of 
temporality has recently been increasing in the public sector while decreasing in the private 
sector. Dolado et al. (2002) also obtain the same result. They point out two main reasons for this 
evolution. Firstly, they argue that there has been a change in the hiring behaviour of the public 
sector in an environment characterised by the budget restrictions imposed by the Growth and 
Stability Pact. Public employees have stronger employment protection legislation than workers in 
the private sector and to compensate this higher rigidity the public sector has more frequently 
used the more flexible temporary contract. Secondly, Local Administrations developed active 
labour market policies (ALMPs), mainly financed by Structural Funds, characterised by the 
hiring of workers in targeted groups under temporary contracts. 
Since the main focus of the paper is to obtain a deeper understanding of the relation between unit 
labour costs and temporary employment we devote the rest of the analysis to this covariate. As 
can be seen in Table 10 the estimated coefficient of unit labour costs is negative and statistically 
significant in all cases. In the second specification, the total effect of unit labour costs on the 
probability of obtaining a permanent contract is divided into two components. One is the 
permanent effect measured by the time average of unit labour costs and the other represents the 
dynamic or short run effect. The results show that both effects are negative and that the dynamic 































Table 10: Probability of having a permanent contract, Spain 1995-2001 (Logit Random Effects Panel Data, N=1276447) 
 








Model 4 (Wage 
ratio, (wp/ wt) )  
 Parameter t-ratio  Parameter t-ratio  Parameter t-ratio  Parameter  t-ratio 
Constant  Term  -16.71 -61.8 -20.47 -64.0 -19.05  -52.4  -17.586  -29.4 
Gender  (1=Man)  1.325 40.8 1.137 33.1 1.713  51.2  1.320 40.2 
Age    0.946 92.7 1.446 36.9 0.987  94.7  0.980 90.0 
Age  squared  -0.007 -61.8 -0.013 -26.4 -0.008  -66.8  -0.008 -63.5 
No  Studies  -3.775 -40.6 -3.021 -33.4 -3.464  -27.6  -4.088 -42.7 
Primary  Studies  -1.365 -28.7 -0.987 -19.7 -1.111  -23.1  -1.615 -28.9 
Secondary Studies   -0.235  -5.8  -0.073  -1.7  -0.183  -4.5  -0.354  -8.6 
Superior Studies (Short-term)  -0.129  -2.4  -0.174  -3.1  -0.181  -3.4  -0.172  -2.8 
Single  -1.288 -36.9 -1.430 -39.9 -1.334  -36.9  -1.324 -36.3 
Medium Skill Occupation  -0.431  -9.7  0.194 2.2 -0.526  -11.1 -0.569 -11.6 
Low Skill Occupation  -2.778  -59.1  -0.194 -2.1 -2.226  -44.1 -2.550 -54.0 
Non-seasonal  job  1.716 18.7 0.231  2.2  1.542  16.5  1.835 20.1 
Small  Firm  0.224 7.95 0.086  1.8  0.133 4.7 0.019 0.6 
Full time job  2.296  57.1  0.501  9.8  2.464  62.1  2.286  50.9 
Private Firm  -0.614  -15.4  0.307  4.5  -0.222  -5.2  -0.765  -19.4 
Small  Firms  (Average)  -  -  0.330  5.6 - - - - 
Full time Job (Average)  -  -  3.842  48.4  -  -  -  - 
Private  Firm  (Average)  -  -  -1.271  -15.5  - - - - 
Small  Firm  (%)  -0.049 -44.9 -0.090 -21.2 -0.017 -6.5  -  - 
Sector’s Size (employment %)  0.081  43.9  0.085  43.9  -0.019  5.2  0.082  45.0 
Unit labour costs  -0.057  -52.3  -0.011  -2.3  -0.001  -3.3  -0.031  -4.7 
Small Firm (Average %)      0.043  9.8  -  -  -  - 
Sector’s Size (employment %, average)  -  -  -0.000  -0.05  -  -  -  - 
Unit labour costs (average)  -  -  -0.051  -11.1  -  -  -  - 
Wage ratio (wp/ wt)   -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.029  -0.6 
Wage ratio (wp/ wt) *Unit labour costs  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.011  -2.0 
Andalusia  -3.637 -28.2 -3.840 -29.2 -3.691  -26.4  -4.710 -55.5 
Aragon -0.872  -5.9  -0.523  -3.5  -1.455  -9.3  -1.882  -17.0 
Asturias -1.388  -9.9  -1.305  -9.0  -1.833  -11.2  -1.788  -16.0 
Balearic Islands  -0.965  -7.3  -0.969  -7.3  -1.020  -6.7  -2.069  -15.9 
Canary  Islands  -3.640 -28.8 -3.769 -29.1 -3.371  -25.5  -4.467 -42.3 
Cantabria -0.357  -2.9  -0.135  -0.9  -1.319  -7.4  -1.531  -10.1 
Castilla-León -1.205  -9.2  -1.031  -7.9 -1.857  -12.2 -2.101 -22.9 
Castilla La Mancha  -2.161  -16.8  -2.287 -18.0 -2.751  -19.8 -3.452 -31.9 
Catalonia  -1.046 -11.1 -1.016 -11.4 -1.646  -15.9  -2.008 -25.7 
Valencia  -2.383 -18.4 -2.407 -18.8 -2.632  -19.4  -3.482 -35.3 
Extremadura -1.283  -8.9  -1.282  -9.0  -1.991  -12.4  -2.632  -24.8 
Galicia  -1.957 -15.0 -1.872 -14.0 -2.737  -19.3  -2.701 -24.4 
Murcia  -2.217 -15.6 -2.361 -16.3 -2.616  -17.1  -3.483 -25.7 
Navarra -0.431  -2.8  -0.474  -3.7  -1.085  -7.7  -1.507  -12.6 
Basque  Country  -1.841 -18.0 -1.713 -16.9 -2.376  -21.7  -2.594 -27.9 
Rioja -0.905  -5.8  -0.956  -6.4  -0.953  -5.7  -1.791  -9.8 
Specialisation in Energy  0.002  0.0  -0.153  -1.7  0.069  0.8  0.002  0.0 
Specialisation in Manufacturing Industry  -0.039  -1.0  0.012  0.3  -0.056  -1.5  -0.033  -0.9 
Specialisation in Construction  -0.007  -0.1  0.026  0.5  0.055  0.3  -0.007  -0.1 
Specialisation in Commerce and Hotels  -0.062  -0.9  -0.014  -0.2  -0.215  -3.4  -0.061  -0.9 
Specialisation in Financial Services  -0.042  -1.7  -0.035  -1.4  -0.087  -3.7  -0.043  -1.8 
Specialisation in Transport and 
Communications 
0.235 6.1 0.216 5.5 0.189  5.1  0.215 4.1 
Specialisation in Professional Services  -0.162  -2.6  -0.223  -3.6  -0.061  -1.0  -0.161  -2.7 
Specialisation in Other Services  0.085 2.6 0.087 2.6 0.088  2.6  0.086 2.8 
Energy -  -  -  -  -0.310  -1.3  -  - 
Manufacturing Industry  -  -  -  -  -0.189  -2.3  -  - 
Construction -  -  -  -  -5.958  -70.2  -  - 
Commerce and Hotels  -  -  -  -  -0.421  -3.6  -  - 
Transport and Communication.  -  -  -  -  -0.971  -7.4  -  - 
Financial Services  -  -  -  -  2.344  15.3  -  - 
Professional. Services  -  -  -  -  -1.352  -8.1  -  - 
ρ  0.931 0.00
* 0.932 0.00
* 0.92  0.00
* 0.93 0.00
* 
Likelihood  Function  318.354    315.785    312.752  317.048  
Notes: Model 2 includes time average of time varying individual variables. 
The constant (Model 1, Model 2, Model 4): Madrid, 1995, Woman, Superior Studies, High Skill Occupation, Non-
single  
The constant (Model 3): Madrid, 1995, Other Services, Woman, Superior Studies, High Skill Occupation, Non-single  






























The third model reported in Table 10 includes sector dummies as covariates. The signs of the 
estimated parameters of these dummies are as expected and corroborate our results in the 
statistical section. As we are already estimating the model controlling for regional dummies, with 
this third model we test if the effect of unit labour costs on the probability of having a permanent 
contract is mainly a “sector” effect or if there are divergences in unit labour costs within sectors 
and across regions that also explain differences in the permanent employment rate. We observe 
that the estimated coefficient of unit labour costs is again negative and statistically significant, 
although the marginal effect is clearly smaller, meaning that industrial labour cost differentials 
are slightly more relevant to explain permanent employment rate differentials across regions and 
industries.  
The model estimated in the fourth column includes two additional covariates: first, the wage ratio 
between permanent and temporary workers, and second the interaction of this variable with unit 
labour costs. With the first variable we measure the wage premium of permanent contracts, which 
might adversely affect the chances of obtaining a permanent contract. With the second variable 
we obtain non-wage labour cost differences  –mainly differences in firing and hiring costs– 
between temporary and permanent employment. We would expect that the higher the wage rate 
of permanent to temporary workers and the higher the interaction term the lower the probability 
of obtaining a permanent contract.  
Firstly, the effect of the wage gap between temporary and permanent employees is not significant 
although the estimated parameter is negative, demonstrating, as wage bargaining and insider-
outsider models predict, that the higher the wage of permanent relative to temporary 
employment, the lower the probability of obtaining a permanent contract. Secondly, even when 
we condition on the wage gap, unit labour costs have a negative impact on the permanent 
employment probability, though slightly lower than in Model 1. Thirdly, as the interaction term 
of these two variables is negative and statistically significant, there seems to be a differential 
effect of the non-wage labour cost of permanent employees on the probability of obtaining a 
permanent contract. From these results we conclude that wage and non-wage labour costs for 
permanent workers influence the probability of obtaining a permanent contract. 
10.  Table 11: Elasticity of the permanent employment rate relative to different covariates 







Model 1   -1.27  -  -0.44  -  - 
Model 2   -0.23 -1.14  -  -  - 
Model 3   -0.20 -  -0.39  -  - 
Model 4  -0.67 -  -  -0.43  -0.87 
 
In Table 11 we compute the elasticity of the permanent employment rate to unit labour costs and 
other aggregate covariates for the four model specifications described above. In the first case –
Model 1–, the elasticity is negative and higher than 1, around 1.27. This means that if unit labour 
costs increase by 1% the probability of obtaining a permanent contract decreases by 1.27%. In 





























larger permanent or long run effect, with elasticity –1.14. From these last results we conclude that 
the effect of unit labour costs on the probability of obtaining a permanent contract is mainly 
structural. This result may be related to the fact that when we include sector dummies –Model 3–, 
the elasticity of the permanent employment rate to unit labour costs decreases to a similar value 
to the above-mentioned short-run effect, around –0.20. This implies that the main source of the 
differences in the permanent employment rate across regions is a structural effect related to 
regional output composition. Nevertheless, it also means that sector unit labour cost differences 
across regions play a role, though smaller, in explaining the divergences in the permanent 
employment rate. To illustrate the idea we can carry out the following exercise. If unit labour 
costs had not increased 17.5% during 1995-2001, as was the case, the probability of having a 
permanent contract would have increased by 3.5%. This means that the average probability of 
having a permanent contract would have been 71.4% instead of 68.5%.  
In the augmented model –Model 4–, the elasticity of the permanent employment rate to unit 
labour costs is decomposed into several components. The elasticity of the permanent employment 
rate to the wage gap is –0.43, relative to unit labour costs is –0.67, and relative to the interaction 
term is –0.87. Interestingly, the elasticity of the interaction term is the largest. Since this 
estimation is conditioned by average unit labour costs and the wage gap, we interpret this 
covariate as describing the non-wage labour cost differential of permanent workers relative to 
temporary ones. Consequently, this result implies that the probability of having a permanent 
contract is more elastic to non-wage unit labour costs of permanent workers than to differences in 
wage differentials.  
11.  Table 12: Mean Squared Error   
  Model 1  
(Baseline) 
Model 2    
(Mundlack 
Correction) 
Model 3   
(Sectoral 
Dummies) 
 ECM  %∆ECM ECM  %∆ECM  %ECM  %∆ECM 
Case 0: Base Model   0.2056  -30%  0.2051 -30% 0.1956  -21% 
Case 1=Case 0-aggregate variables  0.2947 - 0.2939  -  0.2493 - 
Case 2= Case1 + CLU  0.2357  -20%  0.2330 -20% 0.2393 -4% 
Case 3= Case1 + Region Effects.  0.2435 -17% 0.2651  -9%  0.2189 -12% 
Case 4= Case1 + Specialisation  0.2742 -7% 0.2938  -0%  0.2489 -0% 
Case 5= Case1 + Small firm (%)  0.2487 -15% 0.2707  -8%  0.2406  -3% 
Case 6= Case 1+ Sector Effects  - - -  -  0.2293  -8% 
 
So far we have found that unit labour costs are negatively related to the permanent employment 
rate. However, we are also interested in determining whether unit labour costs play a relevant 
role in explaining the observed dispersion in the permanent employment rate across sectors and 
regions. In Table 12 we show the decomposition of the mean squared error (MSE, hereafter) of 
the prediction for different cases. In the first row we display the MSE of the prediction of the 
complete model –Case 0. In the second row we compute the MSE of the prediction when we omit 
all the relevant aggregate covariates –Case 1–, and in the following rows we show the MSE when 
we add each aggregate variable to the MSE prediction –from Case 2 to Case 6. All the measures 





























aggregate variables. The whole model implies a 30% reduction of the MSE of the prediction -
relative to Case 1 in Models 1 and 2 and a 21% reduction in Model 3. From Case 2 to Case 6 we 
add different aggregate covariates, with Model 1 and Model 2, without sector dummies, having 
the largest drop in the MSE when we add unit labour costs to the prediction (around 20%), while 
none of the other aggregate covariates result in such a drop in the MSE. The second relevant 
covariate is regional effects, since they imply a reduction in the MSE of around 17% in Model 1 
and 9% in Model 2. We consider that since we already control for economic factors, these 
regional effects should represent other non-economic reasons. Finally, the regional firms’ size 
explains a certain percentage of the MSE, quite similar to that of regional effects.  
We carry out the same exercise for Model 3 and find that the fall in the MSE when we add unit 
labour costs declines by 4% while the sector effects reduce the MSE by around 8%. The most 
important aggregate component to explain the change in the MSE is regional effects, since they 
reduce the MSE by around 12%. However, when we sum the fall in the MSE when adding the 
sector and unit labour costs we find that it is similar to that obtained for the regional effects.   
12.  Table 13: Comparing the Fixed Effect and Random Effects Model 
  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
Age   0.987  19.7  0.989  29.4 
Age squared  -0.009  -13.7  -0.010  -15.2 
Small Firm  0.590  11.5  0.057  11.0 
Full time job  0.348  6.1  0.395  9.5 
Private Firm  0.347  4.2  0.303  -4.4 
Medium Skill Occupation 0.179  1.9  0.217  2.2 
Low Skill Occupation  -0.150  -1.5  -0.196  -1.9 
Non-seasonal job  1.680  18.0  1.647  17.9 
Specialisation (employment %)  0.034  7.6  0.047  3.2 
Unit labour costs  -0.011  -2.6  -0.008  -5.3 
1996 0.780  16.1  0.234  5.0 
1997 1.570  23.2  -0.259  5.9 
1998 2.768  32.1  -0.392  8.1 
1999 3.841  39.0  0.531  10.1 
2000 4.718  42.7  0.498  8.4 
2001 5.547  45.5  0.703  9.8 
Likelihood Function  27061    50997   
N 77307    77307   
  
Note: The Random Effects Model includes other time varying covariates  
 
At the beginning of this section we argued that given the characteristics of the analysis the 
random effects model was a better choice than the fixed effects model. In order to analyse the 
sensitivity of our conclusions to this choice we have estimated the fixed and the random effects 
model but restricting the sample that corresponds to the last model to be the same as the fixed 
effects sample estimation. The results are displayed in Table 13. We focus on the coefficient of 
unit labour costs. Interestingly, the coefficient of the fixed effect model is very close to that 
obtained in Model 2 for the short-run effect, confirming that with the conditional fixed effect 
model we lose the chance to capture the structural or permanent effect, which we consider to be 
important in our analysis. On the other hand, we can observe that in the random effects model the 





























the sample selection bias that arises when we select the fixed effect estimation, given the 
characteristics of our sample.  
13.  Table 14: Probability of having a permanent contract, Spain 1995-2001 (Logit Random Effects Panel 
Data, (subsample=regions with low permanent employment rate, N=542341) 
 





 Parameter t-ratio  Parameter  t-ratio 
Constant Term  -11.66  -30.3  -11.27  -30.2 
Gender (1=Man)  1.162  24.7  0.978  19.3 
Age   0.736  48.2  1.359  21.9 
Age squared  -0.005  -28.2  -0.012  -19.2 
No Studies  -4.345  -38.4  -3.556  -30.5 
Primary Studies  -1.195  -27.1  -1.531  -20.5 
Secondary Studies   -0.381  -6.1  -0.140  -2.1 
Superior Studies (Short-term)  -0.079  -0.9  -0.198  -2.2 
Single -1.247  -24.3  -1.364  -25.2 
Medium Skill Occupation  -0.470  -6.1  -0.269  -2.1 
Low Skill Occupation  -3.027  -42.1  -0.547  -4.1 
Non-seasonal job  1.588  11.6  1.487  11.6 
Small Firm  0.112  2.9  -0.005  -0.8 
Full time job  2.186  38.8  0.710  9.8 
Private Firm  -0.462  -8.0  0.279  2.9 
Small Firms (Average)  -  -  0.273  3.2 
Full time Job (Average)  -  -  3.141  9.8 
Private Firm (Average)  -  -  0.273  3.3 
Small Firm (%)  -0.064  -33.2  -0.113  -17.9 
Sector’s Size (employment %)  0.079  30.2  0.158  6.2 
Unit labour costs  -0.068  -40.2  -0.017  -2.6 
Small Firm (Average %)  -  -  0.049  7.2 
Sector’s Size (employment %, average)  -  -  -0.085  -3.4 
Unit labour costs (average)  -  -  -0.053  -11.1 
Andalusia -2.527  -27.2  -2.483  -29.2 
Canary Islands  -2.383  -14.8  -2.398  -29.1 
Castilla La Mancha  -1.075 -18.0  -1.010 -18.0 
Valencia -1.449  -14.2  -1.298  -18.8 
Murcia -1.386  -11.3  -1.328  -16.3 
ρ  0.928 0.00
* 0.929 0.00
* 
Likelihood Function  148.428    147.470   
 
       Notes: All Models include time dummy variables 
 Model 2 includes time average of time varying individual variables. 
The constant term (Model 1, Model 2,): Extremadura, 1995, Woman, Superior Studies, High Skill 
Occupation, Non-single. 
  *Standard Error 
4.1.1  Regions with a low rate of permanent employment 
From Figure 1 we learnt that the permanent employment rate differs strongly across regions and 
we identified two main groups: the southern and eastern regions with a low permanent 
employment rate and the northern regions, together with Madrid, with a high permanent 
employment rate. In this section we estimate our reference models for the southern regions to test 
whether these regions exhibit significantly different patterns. The regions considered in the 
present analysis are Andalusia, the Canary Islands, Extremadura, Valencia, Castilla-La Mancha 
and Murcia. 
In Table 14 we present our main results for two reference models
vi: the baseline model and the 





























unit labour costs since this is our main focus. The effects of the rest of variables do not vary 
significantly from the previous estimation. We observe that the estimated parameter of unit 
labour costs is negative, statistically significant and larger than that obtained when using the 
whole sample. In terms of the elasticity of the permanent employment rate to unit labour costs, 
for southern regions this elasticity is higher than the national average, around –1.97. When we 
divide this effect between the short and the long run the latter is also clearly superior to the 
national value, –0.52 and –1.54 respectively. Finally, in terms of the MSE analysis we also find 
that unit labour costs are the most important component to explain the fall in MSE. They imply a 
reduction in the MSE of 23% whereas regional effects cause a reduction of only 4% and the 
percentage of small firms lowers the MSE by 10%. 
5 Conclusion 
With this paper, among other things, we raise the issue whether in order to reduce the temporality 
rate in Spain we should appeal to alternative mechanisms to those employed in the labour market 
reforms carried out during the 1990s. We have summarised and discussed the recent evolution of 
permanent employment in Spain across regions and sectors during the period 1995-2001, 
concluding that there are significant differences in the employment composition by type of 
contract across regions and that these differences seem to persist throughout the period. Our 
particular interest is whether unit labour cost differentials contribute to this disparity in the 
permanent employment rate across regions. These findings may be useful for the policy debate 
regarding the causes of the low permanent employment rate in Spain.  
We use individual data to estimate the relevance of unit labour costs in explaining the probability 
of having a permanent contract. In all cases we find that the higher the unit labour costs the lower 
the probability of having a permanent contract. We decompose the elasticity of the permanent 
employment rate to unit labour costs into two main effects, the short run and the long run effect. 
The short run elasticity is around –0.23 while the long run is more important and rises to –1.14. 
This means that the negative relation between the permanent employment rate and unit labour 
costs is mainly structural and should be related to regional output composition. We also analyse 
whether those regions with lower permanent employment rate show different patterns, and find 
that the elasticity of the permanent employment rate to unit labour costs is much larger in the 
sub-sample comprising Andalusia, the Canary Islands, Valencia, Murcia, Castilla-La Mancha and 
Extremadura. 
Given our results, we conclude that the dispersion observed in the regional probability of having 
a permanent contract may be related basically to regional differences in output composition, but 
also to unit labour cost differentials. We have also found that regional fixed effects play a role in 
determining this probability. Since in our model we include different economic variables at the 
individual and aggregate level, we argue that regional effects mainly account for non-economic 
factors. This means that we must consider other idiosyncratic aspects of regional labour markets 





























Finally, we consider that the results presented in this paper illustrate that the partial labour 
reforms do not have any clear effects on the permanent employment rate since they only imply a 
reduction in firing costs for a certain group of workers. Allowing the use of temporary contracts 
with lower dismissal costs is different to reducing the firing costs of all permanent workers.  
A good example to illustrate our main conclusions is the case of Andalusia. In this region, from 
1997 until 2002 the use of permanent contracts was encouraged through certain economic 
incentives, yet the permanent employment rate in 2001 was still one of the lowest in Spain, just 
above the Canary Islands. This result could be explained by the analysis just presented. Firstly, 
the economic incentives may not have been sufficient to compensate the lower labour 
productivity and the higher total labour compensation found in Andalusia. Secondly, it could be 
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Appendix: Mundlack Correction. 
 
In this section we set out the assumptions behind the Mundlack corrections used in this paper. A more 
detailed explanation can be found in Woodridge (2002). Suppose we define the following latent variable 
model: 
(8)  [ ] ** ,        1 1 kt kt kt kt kt Tx TT β ε =+ =>  
where k stands for individuals and t for years; the matrix xkt contains covariates that vary among individuals 
and are related to personal and labour characteristics. Finally, εkt is the error term whose composition is the 
following:  
(9)  ,       kt k kt ε ωυ =+  
The point of introducing the term ωk is to explicitly allow unobservable variables to be correlated with certain 
elements of xkt. Chamberlain (1980) allowed for correlation between ωk and xkt by assuming a conditional 
normal distribution with linear expectation and constant variance. Mundlack’s version (1978) of 
Chamberlain´s assumption is:  
(10)  ( ) 2 /, kt k k xN o r m a l x ν ω θσ ≈  
where xk stands for the average of xkt and σν
2 is the conditional variance of ωk, which is assumed to be 
independent of xk:  
(11)         kk k x ω θν =+  
Though this assumption is restrictive in that it specifies a distribution of ωk given xk, it at least allows for 
some dependence between the unobserved component ωk and the observed variables xk. Given this 
specification, the estimation of the parameters of the model (β,θ,σν) is straightforward because we can re-
write the latent variable model as: 
(12)  *
kt kt k k kt Txx β θν υ =+ + + , 
where we assume that: 
(13)  ( ) /, 0 , 1 kt kt k xN o r m a l υν ≈  
(14)  ( ) 2 /0 , kt k xN o r m a l ν ν σ ≈  
In other words, by adding the term xk to the model equation for each time period, we arrive at a traditional 
random effects model. Adding xk as a set of controls for unobserved heterogeneity is very intuitive: we are 
estimating the effect of changing xitk  but keeping the time average fixed. Therefore we can proceed to 
estimate the following model, which renders consistent estimated parameters of β: 





























                                                                                                                                                    
i We have already analysed this issue in a previous paper and have found that job mobility is more common 
among women, young and low educated workers and may impose important wage costs (García-Pérez and 
Rebollo, 2005).  
ii They distinguish three components within the concept of labour costs: wages, firing costs and hiring costs. 
iii Compensation is a measure of the cost of the employer securing labour services, and is defined as payroll 
plus supplemental payments. Payroll includes salaries, commissions, dismissal pay, bonuses, vacation and 
sick leave pay. Supplemental payments include employers´ contributions to Social Security, unemployment 
insurance taxes and workers´ compensation. 
iv All figures in the following tables are based on sample rates. Thus, they do not represent population rates, 
although the difference between them is quite insignificant. 
v In the Appendix we describe the main assumptions of this specification. 
vi In this specification we omit relative specialisation since the regions considered have very similar 
productive specialisations. 
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